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THE REGIONAL ELECTIONS OF 1990 
John Bochel and David Denver 
Political parties now take local government elections very seriously, but in 
some respects different levels in the parties have differing interests and 
priorities. At national level parties focus on overall shares of the votes, on the 
total number of seats won or lost and, when the results are favourable to them, 
on the number of councils under the party's controL At local level parties are 
primarily interested in seats won on their particular councils and in control of 
these councils. They also, usually under exhortation from party headquarters, 
have an eye on overall share of the vote, and this accounts, at least in part, for a 
good number of contests in seats where a party has no chance of success. In any 
analysis of local government election results it is necessary to take account of 
both of these perspectives. 
For the Conservatives the 1990 Regional elections were, to some degree, 
a test of their ability to stage a recovery in Scottish politics. It is worth recalling 
that whereas in the general election of 1955 they won a majority of the 
parliamentary seats in Scotland with over 50 per cent of the vote, in 1987 they 
were reduced to 10 seats and a mere 24 per cent of the vote. Worse was to 
follow, for in 1989 they were to lose their two remaining European 
parliamentary seats with a miserable 20.9 per cent of the vote. At local 
government level the Tories began the 1980s with a total of 365 Regional and 
District seats (out of 1 ,555) and ended the decade with just 228 (out of 1 ,600). 
In contrast, Labour's task was simply to maintain their long term primacy 
in Scottish electoral politics. Realistically they could only hope to make 
marginal advances in their own heartland such was their dominance there; 
otherwise they could work away at increasing support elsewhere. 
Complacency seemed to be the major danger. On the other hand, the SNP had 
to try to consolidate its position as second party in share of the vote which it 
achieved in the regional elections of 1986 and again in the European elections 
of 1989; and to make progress throughout the country and particularly in 
Labour territory. The most that the SLD could hope for was to improve on 
their dismal4.3 per cent share of the vote in the European elections (when they 
came fifth behind the Greens) and to maintain their strength in areas where 
they already had a reasonable base, especially in those constituencies in which 
they had MPs. 
In these elections the Conservatives had the daunting task of trying to 
regain the three Regions that they formerly controlled namely, Grampian, 
Tayside and Lothian and to make at least some inroads into Labour's 
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majontles in Strathclyde and Central. Labour could look forward with 
confidence to retaining control of Fife, Lothian, Strathclyde and Central and 
could, without undue optimism, hope to make sufficient gains to entitle them 
to lead minority administrations in Grampian and Tayside after the elections. 
The SNP could not hope to gain control of any Region, but were justifiably 
hopeful of increasing significantly the number of seats they held and of 
improving their share of the vote in most regions. In particular they aspired to 
become the largest party in Tayside and to improve their position in Grampian 
to the extent that they could have an important influence on the administration 
there. Like the SNP the SLD could not hope to win control of a Region and the 
prospect of their wielding much power in any 'hung' council was confined to 
Grampian. 
In the run up to the elections things did not look good for the 
Conservatives. The reorganisation at Scottish Central Office which followed 
the 1987 general election had produced no significant positive results at the 
1988 District elections or at the 1989 European elections. In late 1989 Mrs 
Thatcher had appointed one of her apostles, Michael Forsyth, as chairman of 
the Conservative Party in Scotland. The changes that followed his installation 
were of an organisational and propaganda nature. The former were hardly 
bloodless and, in the short term at least, morale probably suffered. The latter 
could be viewed as perverse in the context of Scottish politics. Whereas 
Malcolm Rifkind tended to soften the Conservative message to make it more 
congruent with Scottish attitudes and values, Forsyth's propaganda offensive 
was a form of shrill and undiluted Thatcherism that had clearly been rejected 
by the mass of Scottish voters over a number of elections. In addition, 
Forsyth's offensive had a petty side to it. His 'monitoring unit' at Central 
Office recorded and publicised the iniquities of Labour controlled local 
authorities, not on large policy issues, but on such details as the number of 
foreign visits made by councillors in the pursuit of the councils' business. 
In the period immediately preceding the May 1990 elections the 
Conservatives still languished in the Scottish opinion polls. The poll tax was no 
more popular with the electorate than it had been in 1988 and the Budget 
speech fiasco undermined their morale and standing still further. In this speech 
the Chancellor, John Major, announced concessions to poll tax payers in 
England and Wales, but made no mention of Scotland. In the subsequent 
furore Conservative spokespersons in Scotland attempted to justify the 
omission, but the opposition so successfully exploited the issue that Malcolm 
Rifkind, the Secretary of State, sought to persuade the Cabinet (with a 
resignation letter as it were in his pocket) to extend the concession to Scotland. 
He succeeded, but not before the damaging allegation that he had been remiss 
in not looking after Scotland's interests had taken its toll. The concession was 
seen moreover, as a half hearted one, as it emerged that in the case of 
Scotland, it was not as in England and Wales to be funded out of 'new' money, 
but from the existing Scottish Office budget. These factors and others made 
the Conservatives' task of engineering a revival of their fortunes in Scotland 
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very difficult. One chance to seize the initiative did occur when Labour in 
Scotland, somewhat prematurely, unveiled their alternative to the poll tax. 
This proposal for a largely property based tax was poorly presented and its 
implications for individuals only partly worked out. The 'roof tax' as it was 
quickly christened by Labour's opponents came like a gift to the beleaguered 
Tories who attempted to capitalise on it through advertising and media 
appearances. Huge posters teased Donald Dewar, the Shadow Secretary of 
State, with the question, 'Donald where's yer figures?'. Malcolm Rifkind 
claimed that they had Labour 'on the rack' and Forsyth predicted that the 
Tories would increase their share of the vote and number of seats in the 
forthcoming Regional elections. They, at least, thought that they had the 
initiative for once. 
Despite this apparent gaffe Labour were entitled to feel confident about 
the outcome of the elections. In the first three months of 1990 the System 
Three poll, published regularly in the Glasgow Herald, gave Labour leads of 
29, 27 and 31 points over their nearest rivals. In addition, Labour's popularity 
was buoyant throughout Britain. National opinion polls showed consistent 
Labour leads over the Conservatives, and it looked as if there was a more than 
even chance that they could win the next general election. This worked to the 
disadvantage of their main rivals the SNP, part of whose case was that there 
was no point in voting Labour in Scotland because they would never form a 
government in Westminster. Nor did the SNP's attacks on Labour's 'timid 
tactics' on the poll tax seem to have much impact. The loss of Labour's 
formerly safe seat of Govan to the SNP at a 1988 by-election did result in a 
temporary decline in Labour support in the opinion polls, but the medium to 
long term effects were slight. 
The Govan result was a great victory and a morale booster for the SNP 
and the ·'afterglow' effect on the polls was impressive though comparatively 
short lived. The big issue for the SNP in the Regional elections was the poll tax. 
There is little evidence however that its campaign or policy of civil 
disobedience in the form of non-payment of the tax brought significant 
dividends in support. Nevertheless the SNP were clearly on an upward curve in 
the run-up to the elections. As ever, a major test for the SNP was the extent to 
which they could make progress in city seats and the Central Belt, in order to 
become a real threat to Labour. That they would make progress generally was 
not in doubt. 
The SLD was still suffering from the failure ofthe party to make an impact 
at a UK level. Poor opinion poll results in Britain as a whole suggested an even 
poorer performance in Scotland. The search for a role in Scottish politics 
which was distinctive and would impress the electerate had to continue. In the 
meantime they could take comfort from the recent record of their old 
incarnation, the Liberal Party, which had shown that they could, by and large 
hold on to former gains and make further progress when things turned their 
way again. 
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Candidates and Party Competition 
The 1990 Regional elections were more competitive than ever before with 
a record 1,515 candidates contesting the 445 divisions. Table 1 gives a 
comparison with 1986. 
Table 1: Party of Candidates 1986-90 
Partisan Regions Non-Partisan Regions Scotland 
1986 1990 1986 1990 1986 1990 
Con 243 294 16 28 259 322 
Lab 297 311 20 31 317 342 
SNP 307 313 23 35 330 348 
All/SLD 231 190 14 22 245 212 
Green 69 109 - 9 69 118 
Ind 23 27 118 105 141 132 
Other 28 38 1 3 29 41 
Total 1198 1282 192 233 1390 1515 
All parties except the SLD had an increased number of candidates. 
In partisan Regions the Conservatives had a major increase (51) bringing 
them close to Labour and the SNP who had more modest increases (14 and 6 
respectively). Labour and the SNP contested more than 92 per cent of the 
divisions in partisan areas and the Conservatives were not far behind at 87 per 
cent. The Greens, obviously encouraged by their performance in the 
European elections, fielded 40 more candidates in partisan Regions than in 
1986. 
The major parties all increased their intervention in non-partisan Regions 
and the Conservatives made a particularly strong assault in Borders where 
they contested 19 of the 23 seats. The number of Independent candidates in 
non-partisan Regions again fell by 13. In 1974 almost 70 percent of the 
candidates in these Regions were Independents, but by 1990 this had fallen to 
45 percent. It seems to be only a matter of time, therefore, before the non-
partisan Regions witness full-scale party politics in local as well as in 
Parliamentary elections. 
The increased intervention of the parties has implications for the nature of 
party competition as is shown in Table 2. In partisan Regions almost all 
divisions are now contested by at least two of the four main parties. All other 
forms of contest are virtually non-existent. There is still room for change in 
non-partisan Regions however. In 1978 only about 7 per cent of divisions in 
these Regions witnessed major party contests and this rose to over one-third in 
1990. This trend is likely to continue. 
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Table 2: Forms of Electoral Competition, 1974-1990 
Partisan Regions 1974 1978 1982 1986 1990 
% Ofo o/o 0/o 0/o 
Major Party Contest 78 86 92 96 97 
Major Party Unopposed 7 9 6 2 * 
Major Party v Ind/Other 14 4 2 2 3 
I nd/Other Contest 1 
Ind Unopposed 2 
Non-Partisan Regions 1974 1978 1982 1986 1990 
% % % % % 
Major Party Contest 13 7 18 13 35 
Major Party Unopposed 1 15 12 11 9 
Major Party v lnd/Other 42 18 27 28 17 
Ind/Other Contest 28 23 15 18 15 
lnd Unopposed 16 37 28 30 25 
Another feature of increased competitiveness is the large increase in the 
incidence of four-party contests in partisan Regions. These rose from just 5 per 
cent of divisions with four party contests in 1974 to 51 per cent in 1986. The 
fielding of fewer SLD candidates reduced this slightly to 48 per cent in 1990, 
but the decline in the number of straight fights (ie only two parties contesting a 
seat) continued and as can be seen in Table 3 accounted for only 11 per cent of 
party contests. 
Table 3: Forms of Party Contest in Partisan Regions, 1974-1990 
1974 1978 1982 1986 1990 
% % % % % 
Four-way Contests 
Con v Lab v All/SLD v SNP 5 6 45 51 48 
Three-way Contests 
Con v Lab v SNP 21 52 16 12 33 
Con v Lab v All/SLD 12 3 9 3 3 
Other Three-way 1 - 10 15 5 
All Three-wa~ 34 55 35 30 41 
Two-way Contest 
ConvLab 42 18 5 1 
LabvSNP 14 11 8 15 6 
Other Two-way 5 9 7 5 4 
AllTwo-wa~ 61 38 20 20 11 
Total Party Contests 254 279 304 321 325 
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We have in the past suggested that party activity rather than issues has 
been responsible for the higher turnout in partisan than in non-partisan 
Regions. Increased party activity in the latter may, therefore, help to explain 
increased turnout in 1990 from 40.1% to 43.2%. There was no change in 
partisan Regions and overall turnout remained virtually unchanged (Table 4). 
Table 4: Percentage Turnout in Contested Divisions 
1974 1978 1982 1986 1990 
0/o % o/o % o/o 
Partisan Regions 50.7 44.8 43.0 45.9 45.9 
Non-partisan Regions 49.6 43.3 40.2 40.1 43.2 
Total 50.4 44.7 42.9 45.6 45.9 
A corollary of increased competition is a decline in the number of 
uncontested elections (Table 5). These are now very rare in partisan regions; 
there was, indeed, only one such case (in Fife) in 1990. For a time it looked as if 
unopposed returns in non-partisan Regions had reached a plateau of about 40 
per cent, but the intervention of the parties reduced this to about one third in 
the latest elections. 
Table 5: Percentages of Contested Divisions 1974-1990 
1974 1978 1982 1986 1990 
% % 0/o % % 
Partisan Regions 92.7 89.3 94.3 98.5 99.7 
Non-Partisan Regions 82.9 47.6 60.0 59.0 66.4 
Scotland 90.3 79.1 85.7 88.8 91.5 
Patterns of Party Support 
These elections produced, on a superficial view, something for all the 
parties to crow about and they duly did so. Despite a net loss of seats the 
Conservatives seized on a very small increase in their share of the votes to 
proclaim that they were on their way back in Scotland. Labour pointed to yet 
another increase in the number of seats won and played down the (admittedly 
small) decline in vote share. The SNP could boast that they had, of all the 
parties, by far the largest percentage increase in share of the vote and also 
increased their tally of seats. Even the SLD who had suffered a severe loss in 
support could point out that they had not incurred a net loss in seats. 
Clearly all could not be winners, and the results require closer 
examination. Table 6 shows the distribution of votes in 1986 and 1990. In 
partisan Regions the Conservatives did indeed increase their share of the vote 
and, as Forsyth had predicted, over Scotland as a whole. Whilst Labour's share 
declined slightly, they still won almost twice as many votes as their nearest 
128 
Scottish Government Yearbook 1991 
Table 6: Party Shares of Votes in Regional Elections 1986-1990 
Partisan Regions Non-Partisan Regions Total 
1986 1990 1986 1990 1986 1990 
% % 0/o o/o % 0/o 
Con 17.3 20.0 9.6 12.5 16.9 19.6 
Lab 45.6 44.6 12.1 12.3 43.9 42.7 
SNP 18.6 22.2 11.5 16.2 18.2 21.8 
All/SLD 15.5 8.4 7.1 11.6 15.6 8.7 
Green 0.5 2.0 3.4 0.5 2.1 
Ind 2.0 2.0 59.2 43.2 4.8 4.5 
Other 0.6 0.9 0.5 0.8 0.6 0.9 
rivals, the SNP. The latter very clearly improved on their 1986 performance 
and again came second in popular support. The SLD won only about half of 
the vote attracted by the Alliance in 1986. 
In non-partisan Regions all of the parties improved their share of the vote. 
The most notable feature here was the slump of 16 percentage points in 
support for Independent candidates. This resulted in the Independents 
winning less than 50 per cent of the vote for the first time. 
The Conservatives advanced in all Regions except Grampian (-4.0 per 
cent). Their 'best' result was in Central, which contains Michael Forsyth's 
constituency (+7.3 per cent), but here they had more than doubled their 
number of candidates (from 11 to 26), whilst the other parties had the same 
number as in 1986. Labour's share was down in four of the six partisan 
Regions, but with the exception of Central (-2.7 per cent) this decline was 
marginal. Fife was the only partisan Region in which the SLD held on to its 
share of the vote (--0.4 per cent), but this relatively good result was partly 
attributable to an increased number of candidates ( + 7); in Lothian and 
Strathclyde a significant drop in the number of SLD candidates (-8 and -42 
respectively) was reflected in a large drop in the share of the vote. The SNP 
advanced in four partisan Regions and by an impressive 10.5 percentage points 
in Grampian, but this result owed quite a lot to an increased number of 
candidates, just as their apparent loss of support in Fife and Central coincided 
with changes in the number of candidates put forward. 
The raw figures in Table 6 could be misleading because they do not take 
account of variations in candidatures. A more accurate measure of trends in 
party support can be obtained if we compare cases in which all four parties 
fought the same seats in 1986 and 1990. This controls for changes in the 
number of candidates. There were 108 divisions which were contested by the 
four parties in both years and Table 7 shows how they performed in these. The 
Conservatives did indeed increase their share of the total votes in all of these 
divisions taken together (+2.6 points), but so also did Labour (+1.3 points) 
and any Conservative advance relative to Labour is very small indeed. 
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Table 7: Party Support in Four-Party Divisions, 1986-1990 
Con Lab SNP AII/SLD 
% % % o;o 
All Divs (108) 
1986 23.7 41.4 12.9 22.0 
1990 26.3 42.7 17.8 13.2 
Lab held ( 65) 
1986 15.6 53.2 14.2 17.0 
1990 16.9 54.6 20.3 8.2 
Con held (29) 
1986 43.3 21.0 10.5 25.1 
1990 48.3 25.0 14.0 12.6 
Alliance held (13) 
1986 24.8 20.6 9.8 44.7 
1990 24.4 21.2 12.1 42.3 
Expressed as a swing the figures suggest a movement of only 0.7 points from 
Labour to Conservative, that is virtually no change. 
Table 7 does show, however, that the SNP did rather well, if not 
sensationally so, in these seats ( +4. 9 points), suggesting that overall, the SNP 
advance was not accounted for by an increase in the number of candidates. By 
the same token the Table indicates that the decline in the SLD vote was not 
simply a function of the number of candidates put forward, but represented 
real fall in support. 
A further analysis of these seats shows that the Conservatives did best in 
seats that they already held ( +5.0 per cent), but that this was almost matched 
by an increased Labour share in the same seats ( +4.0 per cent). Labour also 
improved its share in its own territory ( + 1.4 per cent) and this was slightly 
larger than the Conservatives' increase in the same seats ( + 1.3 per cent). 
There were not enough SNP cases to allow a similar analysis for them, but it is 
obvious that they made most progress in Labour seats (+6.1 per cent), 
although they advanced in seats held by the other parties too. The SLD lost 
most ground in Conservative held seats (-12.5 per cent), but also suffered a 
substantial setback in Labour held divisions. They did less badly, however, in 
seats that they already held (-2.4). What seems to be indicated here is an 
apparent consolidation of strength in the parties' own territories. It is unclear 
on the available evidence whether it is incumbency that gives an advantage or 
whether the parties successfully targeted their efforts to exploit existing 
support. 
Council Seats Won 
Much is made by parties themselves and by the media of the shares of 
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votes obtained in local elections because of the implications for parliamentary 
elections. This is unfortunate because it tends to demote the importance of 
local government. It should not be forgotten that even though local authorities 
arc much circumscribed by central government in the functions that they 
perform and the money they spend, the results of these elections have 
considerable direct effects on the population of each local authority area. It is 
necessasry, therefore to give some attention to the manner in which trends in 
party choice are translated into Regional council seats and thus party control 
of councils. Table 8 shows the seats won by the parties in partisan and non-
partisan Regions in 1986 and 1990. Overall the Conservatives were the only 
party to Jose seats (-13) reducing them to their lowest level ever. Such a result 
sits oddly with Conservative claims immediately after the election that they 
had begun an electoral comeback in Scotland. 
Table 8: Regional Council Seats Won 1986-1990 
Partisan Regions Non-Partisan Regions Total 
1986 1990 1986 1990 1986 1990 
Con 57 48 8 4 65 52 
Lab 209 213 14 20 223 233 
SNP 27 34 9 8 36 42 
AIIISLD 31 29 9 11 40 40 
Green - - - 1 - 1 
Ind 10 9 69 64 79 73 
Other 1 2 1 2 2 4 
Scotland 335 335 110 110 445 445 
In partisan Regions Labour recorded yet another increase, taking their 
tally of seats to 213, four and a half times as many as the next party, the 
Conservatives. The latter had a net Joss of 9 seats in these Regions. The 
Conservatives' worst result carne in Grampian (a Region that they controlled 
until 1986) where they lost six seats and carne fourth in terms of the number of 
councillors. Although the SNP carne a clear second in share of the vote in 
partisan Regions, their count of seats did not reflect this achievement; a net 
gain of six seats, most of them in Grampian, seems a poor reward. In contrast, 
the SLD which lost quite heavily in share of the votes ended up with a net loss 
of only two seats in the partisan Regions and with no change over Scotland as a 
whole. 
In non-partisan Regions the number of Independent councillors fell yet 
again and Labour was most successful in making advances, particularly in 
Highland ( + 3) and Dumfries and Galloway ( + 3). The Greens, who obtained 
3.4 per cent of the vote in these Regions were rewarded with a symbolically 
important first seat, in the Highland Region. 
In sum, the various gains and losses did not result in any changes in single 
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party control of Regional councils. Labour remains the majority party in Fife, 
Lothian, Central and Strathclyde, and is again the largest party (although 
without a majority) in Grampian and Tayside where they lead minority 
administrations. Thus Labour either controls or administers on an 
understanding with other parties all six of the partisan Regions in Scotland. 
Independents are still the largest group in each of the non-partisan Regions, 
but they effectively lost control of Dumfries and Galloway as a result of 
arrangements amongst parties there. 
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